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FIREARMS IDENTIFICATION: THE NEED FOR A
CRITICAL APPROACH TO, AND POSSIBLE
GUIDELINES FOR, THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
"BALLISTICS" EVIDENCE
[T]he forensic science disciplines exhibit wide variability with
regard to techniques, methodologies, reliability, level of error, research,
general acceptability, andpublished material .... Many of the processes
used in the forensic science disciplines are ...not based on a body of
knowledge that recognizes the underlying limitations of the scientific
principles . . . . [S]ome of these activities [encompassed by the term
'forensic science, "]might not have a well developed research base, are
not informed by scientific knowledge, or are not developed within the
culture of science.'
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 20, 2001, detectives found a loaded Hi Point, .380
caliber pistol, in the front yard of a home on Esmond Street in Boston. 2 In
the trial of United States v. Green,3 the government sought to introduce
testimony from a Boston Police detective who claimed that fourteen shell
casings, found more than a year earlier at different locations in Boston, all
came from that same gun.4 The police detective concluded that this match
could be made "to the exclusion of every other firearm in the world."5
Firearms identification is a type of forensic science that has long
been used in courts as evidence.6 Testimony to a "match," like that offered
by the government's expert in Green, has been used in courts for decades,
and the reliability of this type of forensic science was once taken for

1

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE

A PATH FORWARD 38-39 (2009) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING
quoted in Procedural Order: Trace Evidence at 1-2, United States v.
Oliveira,
No.
1:08-cr-10104-NG
(D.
Mass.
Mar.
8,
2010),
available at
http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/pdf/ProcOrderTraceEvidenceUPDATE.pdf.
2 See United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005) (describing location
IN THE UNITED STATES:
FORENSIC SCIENCE],

of shooting at issue in case).
3 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005).
4 See id. (detailing locations where forensic evidence was discovered).
5 See id. at 107 (explaining government's key expert testimony inthe case).
6 See generally Commonwealth v. Best, 62 N.E. 748, 750 (Mass. 1902) (allowing evidence
of comparison of bullets to prove three bullets passed through same rifle barrel).
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granted.7 Recently, many forms of forensic science, including firearms
identification, have been subject to scholarly scrutiny, and the reliability of
firearms identification evidence has been significantly criticized.8
Regardless of the criticism, admissibility of various types of forensic
evidence is still the norm.9
In many cases in which firearms identification is used as evidence,
the liberties at stake are significant. 10 Indeed, the defendants in Green
faced the death penalty." While these cases may not turn on the firearms
identification alone, this evidence should not be submitted to a jury without
establishing reliability. 2 The problems with the admissibility and
reliability of forensic evidence may be widespread, and the justice system
could significantly suffer as a result. 3
7 See Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the Reliability andAdmissibility ofFirearms
and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REv. 2, 33 (2005), http://www.stlr.org

/cite.cgi?volume-6&article-2 ("[N]o court has recognized the systemic scientific problems with
firearms identification. Instead, courts have tended to wave away challenges to the reliability and
admissibility of this type of testimony by pointing to its longstanding admission in court.").
8 See Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Under the Microscope, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV.

315, 340 (2008) ("[T]here is a critical need for independent scientific validation of forensic
techniques."); see also J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stem, Devil in a White Coat: The
Temptation of Forensic Evidence in the Age of CSI, 41 NEw ENG. L. REv. 503, 531-32 (2007)

(criticizing acceptance of "junk science" and arguing for "fundamental reevaluation' of forensic
evidence in the courtroom); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift
in Forensic IdentificationScience, 309 SCI. 892, 895 (2005) ("[W]e envision a paradigm shift in
the traditional forensic identification sciences in which untested assumptions and semi-informed
guesswork are replaced by a sound scientific foundation and justifiable protocols."). "[T]he time
is ripe for the traditional forensic sciences to replace antiquated assumptions of uniqueness and
perfection with a more defensible empirical and probabilistic foundation." Saks & Koehler,
supra.

9 See Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 122 ("Although the scholarly literature is extraordinarily
critical, court after court has continued to allow the admission of this testimony." (footnote
omitted)); see also Simon A. Cole, Toward Evidence-Based Evidence: Supporting Forensic
Knowledge Claims in the Post-DaubertEra, 43 TULSA L. REv. 263, 263-64 (2007) ("[C]ase law

strongly supports the conclusion that the exclusion under the Daubert/Kumho standard for
forensic evidence proffered by the government remains rare indeed, despite some recent
exclusions.").
10 See Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 109 (noting liberty "hang[ing] in the balance" for
defendants in this case was "life itself").
11 Id.

12 See DiFonzo & Stem, supra note 8, at 503-07 (explaining "CSI effect" on
jurors).
Specifically, the problem with the "CSI effect" is the "misleading presentation of forensic
evidence [to the jury] in the guise of scientific truth." Id. at 507; see also William C. Thompson

& Rachel Dioso-Villa, Turning a Blind Eye to Misleading Scientific Testimony: Failure of
ProceduralSafeguards in a Capital Case, 18 ALB. L.J. Sc'. & TECH. 151, 155-69 (2008)

(demonstrating problem of forensic evidence presented to jury in a misleading manner through a
case analysis).
13 See Thompson& Dioso-Villa, supra note 12, at 151 ("[S]ystemic problems with the use of
scientific evidence ... could affect the fairness of criminal trials nationwide .... ); Edward J.

56

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVII

The court in Green acknowledged scholarly criticism, but
14
reluctantly followed significant precedent to admit ballistics testimony.
The court admitted the expert's testimony comparing the gun and the shell
casings, but the court did not admit the statement that the shell casings
came from the specific pistol, "to the exclusion of every other firearm in
the world." 15 While the court noted that ballistic testimony has longstanding recognition, it issued a warning: "[The] reliance on long-standing
use of ballistics evidence in the courts is troubling. It runs the risk of
'grandfathering in irrationality,' without reexamining it in the light
of[present evidentiary standards] ."6
This Note explores the problems with the reliability of firearms
identification evidence and the resulting implications for the future of its
admissibility in trials, by first describing the history of the use of firearms
identification as evidence.' 7 This Note then focuses on the standards of
admissibility and how courts apply those standards, by discussing various
cases with significant rulings on admissibility.' 8 Additionally, this Note
also explains scholarly criticism of firearms identification evidence.' 9
Finally, this Note discusses problems with the current state of admissibility
of firearms identification evidence, and it explores cases offering potential
new guidelines for this type of evidence. 0
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Firearms identification is "the analysis of bullet and cartridge case
evidence and the use of that evidence to link specimens to each other and to
particular weapons.",2 The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") once
defined this discipline more specifically as the "forensic science discipline
that identifies a bullet, cartridge case or other ammunition component as

Ungvarsky, The CSI Effect: The True Effect of Crime Scene Television on the Justice System:
Remarks on the Use andMisuse of ForensicScience to Lead to False Convictions, 41 NEW ENG.

L. REv. 609, 616 ("Ballistic toolmark evidence is just one example of a forensic field whose
application can lead to a wrongful conviction."); see also infra note 45 and accompanying text.
14 Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 109 (allowing testimony because judge thought any other
decision would be rejected by appellate courts).
15 Id. at 108-09.
16 Id. at 123.
17 See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.

18 See infra notes 29-49, 62-100 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
20 See infra Part IV.
21 See Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 942 N.E.2d 927, 937 (Mass. 2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting
BALLISTIC IMAGING 15 (2008)).

NAT'L RESEARCH

COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS.,
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having been fired by a particular firearm to the exclusion of all other
firearms." 22 This type of forensic science is often referred to as "ballistics"
(e.g., "ballistics testimony" or "ballistics evidence"); however, this term is
considered incorrect by scholars, as "ballistics" is the "study of the
dynamics of projectiles in flight," not specifically the study of bullets or
cartridges projected from a firearm. 23 Firearms identification involves the
comparison of "toolmarks," which are markings or impressions left on the
bullet or cartridge case when the firearm is discharged.24 Various
characteristics of toolmark impressions are produced that allow for
comparison of bullets and cartridge cases.25 According to firearms
examiners, individual toolmark 26characteristics are unique and can be
associated with a specific firearm.
A. Use in Courts as Evidence
Firearms identification was first used as evidence in trials in the
early 1900s. 27 Although there was some criticism of the technique in early
22

FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC

SCIENCE 57 (1994). The FBI Handbook introduced fireanms-toolmarks services provided by the
FBI, claiming, "Examinations may positively conclude that the bullet or cartridge case was or
was not fired by a particular firearm." Id.
23 See Pytou Heang, 942 N.E.2d at 938 n.15 (quoting NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE

NAT'L ACADS., BALLISTIC IMAGING

15 (2008)) ("The more precise term is either 'forensic

ballistics' or 'firearms identification."'); see also Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert Challenges to
Firearms ("Ballistics") Identifications, 43 CRvI. L. BULL. 548, 549 (2007) (noting common
terminology was incorrect).
24 See Paul C. Giannelli, FirearmsIdentification ("Ballistics"), CRIM. JUST., Winter 2007, at
28, 28 (describing basics of firearms identification).
25 See United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 110-11 (D. Mass. 2005) (explaining
"ballistics" examination and classes of characteristics). Toolmarks can include "class" or "subclass" characteristics as well as individual characteristics. Id. at 107. Class and sub-class
characteristics occur as part of the manufacturing process; therefore, hundreds of firearms can
contain the same class or sub-class characteristics.
Id. at 111.
In contrast, individual
characteristics are "imparted from the actual piece, the actual tool." Id.
26 STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 150 ("'[I]ndividual characteristics'
of toolmarks ... are reproduced by the use of that tool and only that tool."). Toolmark
identification is not limited to firearms; "[t]oolmarks are generated when a hard object (tool)
comes into contact with a relatively softer object." Id. "[T]oolmarks may occur in the
commission of a crime when an instrument such as a screwdriver, crowbar, or wire cutter is used
or when the internal parts of a firearm make contact with the brass and lead that comprise
ammunition." Id.
27 See Commonwealth v. Best, 62 N.E. 748, 750 (Mass. 1902) (allowing evidence of
comparison of bullets to prove all passed through same rifle barrel). Chief Justice Oliver Wendall
Holmes authored the opinion and stated, "We see no other way in which the jury could have
learned so intelligently how that gun barrel would have marked a lead bullet fired through it, a
question of much importance to the case." Id. at 750; see also Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang,
942 N.E.2d 927, 937 (2011) (noting Best first court to uphold admissibility of forensic ballistics
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cases, firearms identification became widely accepted in courts across the
country. 28 However, the standards for admissibility of scientific evidence
and expert testimony changed considerably over time. 29 For example, in
1923, in Frye v. United States,g° the District of Columbia Circuit
established the original standard for admissibility of expert testimony on
scientific evidence. 3' The court in Frye rejected the admissibility of
testimony based on an early form of the polygraph test.3 2 The court held
that the technique or theory must have gained "general acceptance" in the
specific scientific field.33 The Frye standard was adopted
nationwide and
34

remained the basis for expert testimony for seventy years.

In 1993, the Supreme Court relaxed the standard of admissibility of
scientific evidence and expert testimony in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc.35 In place of the "general acceptance" test of Frye,
the Court established several factors that judges can use to determine
whether scientific evidence is reliable and admissible as evidence.36 The
evidence from expert testimony).
28 See People v. Berkman- 139 N.E. 91, 94 (Ill. 1923) (finding that statement identifying
bullet fired from a specific gun was "preposterous"). But see People v. Fisher, 172 N.E. 743, 754
(Ill. 1930) (finding expert testimony that shotgun shells were fired from specific shotgun was
"competent"); Giannelli, supra note 23, at 549 (explaining after early cases the firearms
identification technique "gained widespread judicial acceptance"). Giannelli also noted that
Fisherwas one of the first courts to admit this type of evidence. Giannelli, supra note 23, at 549.
29 Compare Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (establishing original
standard of admissibility of scientific evidence), with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phanm., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (abolishing standard of admissibility adopted in Frye for a more relaxed
standard). See infra notes 31-42 and accompanying text (explaining change in admissibility
standard).
30 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
31 Id. at 1014 ("When the question involved does not lie within the range of common
experience or common knowledge, but requires special experience or special knowledge, then the
opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular science, art, or trade to which the question relates
are admissible in evidence.").
32 See id. at 1013-14 (describing "systolic blood pressure deception test").
'

See id. at 1014.

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.
Id.
34
3'
36

See Daubert,509 U.S. at 587 (1993) (rejecting standard of admissibility adopted in Frye).
509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95 (discussing several factors pertinent to judge's inquiry
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standard under Daubert is one of reliability and relevancy.37 The Court in
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael3 8 followed this approach to admissibility
and held that the reliability standard of Daubert applies to all expert
testimony, not only to scientific evidence.39 The Court in Kumho,
following Daubert, emphasized that it is up to the trial judge to determine
reliability.40 Moreover, the holding in Daubert is codified as Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence .41 To date, thirty-two states have adopted
the Daubert standard, twelve states have
rejected it, and seven states have
42
neither accepted nor rejected Daubert.
The flexible standard of Daubert and Kuhmo permits tremendous
into admissibility of scientific evidence); see also supra note 33 and accompanying text
(discussing the Frye standard). The factors established include: (1) whether the theory or
technique can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subject to peer review and
publication; (3) the potential or known rate of error; (4) the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique's operation; and (5) general acceptance in the relevant
scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
37 Daubert,509 U.S. at 592-93 ("[Admissibility of scientific testimony] entails a preliminary
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
issue.").
38 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
39 See id. at 147-48 ("[A]s a matter of language, [Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence]
applies its reliability standard to all 'scientific,' 'technical,' or 'other specialized' matters within
its scope. We concede that the Court in Daubertreferred only to 'scientific' knowledge. But as
the Court there said, it referred [only] to 'scientific' testimony 'because that was the nature of the
expertise' at issue.").
40 Id. at 152 ("Otherwise, the trial judge would lack the discretionary authority needed both
to avoid unnecessary 'reliability' proceedings in ordinary cases where the reliability of an
expert's methods is properly taken for granted, and to require appropriate proceedings in the less
usual or more complex cases where cause for questioning the expert's reliability arises.").
41 See FED. R. EVID. 702.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form

of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness
has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Id.
42

See MARTIN S. KAUFMAN, ATL. LEGAL FOUND., THE STATUS OF DAUBERT IN STATE

1-3 (2006), available at http://www.atlanticlegal.org/daubertreport.pdf (discussing
different states' approaches following Daubert); see also Order Amending the Arizona Rules of
Evidence & Rule 17.4(f), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure at 34, In re Petition to Amend
Rules of Evid. & Rule 17.4(f), Ariz. Rules of Crim. Proc., No. R-10-0035 (Ariz. Sept. 7, 2011),
available at http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/21/MinutesCurrent/R100035.pdf (adopting Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 as state standard of admissibility); S. 1, 2011 Leg., Jan. Spec. Sess. (Wis.
2011), available at https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/related/acts/2.pdf (amending state
statute 907.02 to comply with Federal Rule of Evidence 702).
COURTS
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Often, the expert will

attempt to testify to the "ultimate conclusion"; in cases of firearms
identification, this means that the bullet or cartridge is a match "to the
exclusion of every other firearm in the world." 44 However, scientific
evidence, including firearms identification and expert testimony derived
from that evidence, has not always been reliable:
one firearms
identification audit concluded that "the negative impact on the judicial

system [of firearms identification] would be substantial, with a strong
likelihood of wrongful convictions and a valid concern about numerous

appeals.

45

After Daubert, there were more challenges to the use of forensic
science in the courtroom, including challenges to the use of firearms
identification; however, despite these challenges, courts continued to admit
firearms identification expert testimony. 46 Five years after Daubert, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Scheffer 47 compared polygraph evidence
with "more acceptable forms of expert testimony," including testimony
regarding "ballistics., 48
Although the Court in Scheffer was not

43 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phanm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590-91 (1993) (establishing
admissibility standard of scientific evidence based on reliability and relevance); see also Kumho
Tire, 526 U.S. at 141 (following holding of Daubert).
44 See United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005) (quoting Boston

Police Sergeant Detective James O'Shea); see also STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra
note 1, at 150 ("Firearm and toolmark examiners believe that toolmarks may be traced to the
physical heterogeneities of an individual tool that is, that 'individual characteristics' of
toolmarks may be uniquely associated with a specific tool or firearm ....
").This type of "exact
match" and "ultimate conclusion" testimony occurs in cases involving other types of forensic
science as well, such as handwriting analysis cases. See United States v. Mooney, 315 F.3d 54,
61-64 (1st Cir. 2002) (allowing handwriting expert's testimony that defendant was author of
certain letters admitted into evidence); United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 63-64 (D. Mass.
1999) (disallowing expert to testify to actual authorship of note in handwriting analysis case).
45 See FORENSIC SCI. DIV., MICH. STATE POLICE, DETROIT POLICE DEP'T FIREARMS UNIT
PRELIMINARY AUDIT FINDINGS AS OF SEPTEMBER 23, 2008, at 3 (2008) (alteration inoriginal).
Of the thirty-three cases that were reanalyzed, three exhibited inconsistencies, such as an
erroneous identification, false identification or false positive. Id. In total, this equates to
approximately 10% of the completed firearms cases having significant errors. Id.; see also Saks
& Koehler, supra note 8, at 892 (explaining data analysis results from 86 exonerated DNA cases).
In a study of post-conviction DNA exonerations conducted by the Innocence Project at Cardozo
School of Law, forensic evidence testing errors occurred in 63% of cases, and false or misleading
testimony by forensic scientists occurred in 2 7% of cases. Saks & Koehler, supra note 8, at 892.
46 See Giannelli, supra note 24, at 28 ("Once Daubert attacks on the admissibility of
handwriting and fingerprint evidence had been launched, it was inevitable that firearms and
toolmark identifications would also be challenged. The initial attacks failed.").
47 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
48 See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 313 (comparing polygraph evidence to "analysis of fingerprints,
ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene"); see also Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 123 (explaining
Scheffer and effect on acceptance of ballistics evidence).
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considering the admissibility of firearms identification evidence, because of
the "casual reference to ballistics, likely without any argument on the issue,
many lower
courts have cited this opinion as validating the use of ballistics
49
experts.
III. FACTS
A. Criticism ofAdmissibility of FirearmsIdentificationEvidence
Many techniques in various areas of forensic science, including
firearms identification, have long been subject to criticism.50 Recently,
there has been more skepticism of methodologies used in the field of
forensic science, and scholars have called for validation of these
"scientific" techniques. 5
In 2005, the FBI discontinued bullet lead
examinations, a specific type of ballistics analysis in which crime scene
bullets are compared to bullets associated with a particular suspect. 52 One
of the significant reasons for this discontinuation was that "neither
scientists nor bullet manufacturers are able to definitively attest to the
significance of an association
made between bullets in the course of a
53
bullet lead examination.,

In 2009, the National Research Council ("NRC") of the National
Academy of Sciences published a report to Congress identifying the needs
of the forensic science community, which has brought to light the serious
problems with various types of forensic evidence on a national scale.54
One of the main problems with the firearms identification methodology is
that the final conclusion is subjective:
49 Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 123; see cases cited supra note 48.
50

See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing scholarly criticism of forensic science

techniques); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing early criticism of firearms
identification evidence).
51 See, e.g., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 12-13; Giannelli, supra
note 8, at 316, 340 (acknowledging "generation of reform" and "critical need for independent
scientific validation of forensic techniques"); Saks & Koehler, supra note 8, at 895 (identifying
need for "sound scientific foundation and justifiable protocols" in forensic identification
sciences).
52 See Press Release, FBI Nat'l Press Office, FBI Laboratory Announces Discontinuation of
Bullet Lead Examinations (Sept. 1, 2005), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/pressreleases/fbi-laboratory-announces-discontinuation-of-bullet-lead-examinations

(explaining

reasoning for discontinuance).
" See id.
54 See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 1, at xx ("The forensic science
system, encompassing both research and practice, has serious problems that can only be

addressed by a national commitment to overhaul the current structure that supports the forensic
science community in this country.").
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[The] determination of a match is always done through
direct physical comparison of the evidence by a firearms
examiner, not the computer analysis of images .... [E]ven
with more training and experience using newer techniques,
the decision of the toolmark examiner remains a subjective
decision based on unarticulated standards and no statistical
foundation for estimation of error rateS.
The Supreme Court cited the 2009 NRC report in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts,56 noting that "[s]erious deficiencies have been found in the
57
forensic evidence used in criminal trials.
A similar report published by the National Research Council in
2008, specifically on "Ballistic Imaging," concluded that "[t]he validity of
the fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and reproducibility of firearmsrelated toolmarks has not yet been fully demonstrated." 58 Additionally,
regarding the type of exact-match conclusion that the prosecution tried to
admit in Green, the 2008 NRC report concluded,
[E]xaminers tend to cast their assessments in bold
absolutes, commonly asserting that a match can be made
"to the exclusion of all other firearms in the world." Such
comments cloak an inherently subjective assessment of a
match with an extreme probability statement that has no
firm grounding and unrealistically implies an error rate of
59
zero.
The findings of the NRC reports opened the door for defense
attorneys to challenge the validity of firearms identification evidence.60 In
" See id. at 153-54.
129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).

56
17

Id. at 2537.

58 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., BALLISTIC IMAGING 81 (2008),

cited in Paul C. Giannelli & Susan Friedman, The National Academy of Sciences' Forensics
Report, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 1109, 1130 (2009).
59 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., BALLISTIC IMAGING 82 (2008); see
United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005).
60 See Giannelli & Friedman_ supra note 58, at 1136.
In the short run, the Report will be used by defense counsel to challenge forensic
techniques. Overstatements should be challenged:
The NAS Report criticized
"exaggerated" testimony such as claims of "perfect accuracy," infallibility, and "zero
error rates." After the Report, it will be difficult for testimony that uses this jargon to
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light of the NRC reports, more courts followed some of the reasoning in
Green to disallow testimony
as to a match "to the exclusion of every other
', 61
world.
the
in
firearm
B. Courts Admitting FirearmsIdentification Evidence
Cases decided after Daubert, but before the release of the NRC
reports, often cited the long history of recognizing the reliability of
firearms identification as reasoning for its admissibility. 62 In United States
v. Hicks,63 the defense challenged the reliability of the methodology of the
prosecution's expert, who claimed that he could match shell casings to a
specific weapon.6 4 The Fifth Circuit allowed the evidence, stating that "the
matching of spent shell casings to the weapon that fired them has
been a
65
recognized method of ballistics testing in this circuit for decades.,
Following the decision in Green, which was highly critical of the
existing ballistics testing methodology, and notwithstanding scholarly
criticism of firearm identification techniques, some courts nevertheless
continue to find firearms identification to be reliable and allowed testimony
as to a "match" between recovered bullets or cartridges and a specific
firearm.6 6 A Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Meeks,67 provides one
example in which a challenge to the admissibility of firearms identification
evidence failed. 68 In Meeks, the defense sought to exclude this type of
survive objections from defense counsel.
Id.
61

See Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 107; see also infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text

(discussing recent cases allowing testimony but not to an "exact match").
62 See Paul C. Giannelli, Ballistics Evidence Under Fire, 25 CR\IM. JUST. 50, 50 (2011)
("[lnitial post-Daubertcases challenging the admissibility of firearms ... identification evidence
were unsuccessful."); see also, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 526 (5th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Foster, 300 F. Supp. 2d 375, 376 n.1 (D. Md. 2004) ("Ballistics evidence has
been accepted in criminal cases for many years ....[N]umerous cases have confirmed the
reliability of ballistics identification."); Fleming v. State, 1 A.3d 572, 590 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2010) ("[C]ourts have consistently found the traditional method to be generally accepted within
the scientific community, and to be reliable.").
63 389 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2004).
64 See id. at 523-24 (describing expert's testimony).
65 Id. at 526.
66 See, e.g., United States v. Natson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1261-62 (M.D. Ga. 2007);
Fleming v. State, 1 A.3d 572, 591 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010); Commonwealth v. Meeks, No.
2002-10961, 2006 WL 2819423, at *49 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2006); People v. Givens, 912
N.Y.S.2d 855, 857 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
67 No. 2002-10961, 2006 WL 2819423 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2006).
68 2006 WL 2819423, at *43 ("The ballistics evidence in this case is ...not excluded as
unreliable because 'the reasoning or methodology underlying the [expert] testimony is' generally
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evidence in two separate murder cases. 69 Despite the persuasive reasoning
of Green, which the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts decided one year earlier, the court held that "[t]he theory
and process of firearms identification are generally accepted and
reliable." 70
However, the court demanded slightly more specific

information from the prosecution's expert, stating that "[a]t trial, this court
will require the Commonwealth's firearms identification witnesses to
provide, on direct examination, detailed reasons for their opinions, as well
as appropriate documentation such as sketches and photographs." 71
In more recent cases, both federal and state courts have allowed
"exact match" type testimony, despite criticism of the forensic techniques
involved. 72 In United States v. Natson,73 decided in 2007, the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia allowed an expert to
testify to not only a match between the defendant's gun and a cartridge
found at the crime scene, but to a one hundred percent degree of certainty.74

As recently as this past year, state court decisions have also
allowed for firearms identification expert testimony as to an "exact
match.

75

In the Maryland case of Fleming v. State,7 6 the court cited a

forty-year-old case that took 'judicial notice" of the reliability of firearms
identification. 77 The court reasoned that firearms identification had long
been admitted, and "notwithstanding the current debate on the issue, courts
have consistently found the traditional method to be generally accepted
accepted and 'properly can be applied to the facts in issue."' (alteration in original) (quoting
Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993))).
69 See id. at * 1-2 (introducing facts of case).
70 Id. at *50 (concluding that experts could testify as to their opinions of a match).
71 Id. at *48.
72 See infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text (surveying cases still admitting this type of
testimony).
7' 469 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (M.D. Ga. 2007).
74 Id. at 1261 ("[T]hese toolmarks were sufficiently similar ....

[The expert] opined that he

held this opinion to a 100% degree of certainty.").
75 See Fleming v. State, 1 A.3d 572, 591 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010); see also People v.
Givens, 912 N.Y.S.2d 855, 856 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
76 1 A.3d 572 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010).
77 Id. at 590.
[I]ndeed, Reed v. State referred to "ballistics" as an example of a discipline for which
"the validity and reliability is so broadly and generally accepted' that under the FryeReed standard, "a trial court may take judicial notice of its reliability. Although Reed
was decided over thirty years ago, notwithstanding the current debate on the issue,
courts have consistently found the traditional method to be generally accepted within
the scientific community, and to be reliable.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 367 (Md. 1978)).
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within the scientific community, and to be reliable. 7 8 In a New York state
court decision, in People v. Givens,79 the court allowed testimony that six
shell casings recovered from the crime scene were fired from the same
gun.80 The Givens court also cited the traditional acceptance of firearms
identification, stating that "[i]n none of the cases cited by the defendant did
a Court find that firearms and toolmark identification is no longer
scientifically acceptable or is unreliable."8 '
C. Courts Criticalof FirearmsIdentification Evidence
Again, the court in Green was one of the first to take a critical look
at admissibility of firearms identification evidence, and it disallowed "exact
match" testimony as unreliable .82 The defendants, facing the death penalty,
challenged the admissibility of the forensic ballistics identification
evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.83 The court found many
problems with the admissibility of the detective's testimony:
the
government's expert had not received proficiency testing or certification in
ballistics; he did not follow the toolmark protocols, systematize his past
experience, examine any other weapon, make notes or photographs of the
evidence, or have data on error rates; and he relied mainly on his subjective
judgment without a national standard in conducting an "evidence showup.

,,84

Since Green, and following publication of the NRC reports to
Congress, more courts have been critical of expert testimony on firearms
identification.8 5 For example, in United States v. Monteiro,86 a case
71 Fleming, 1 A.3d at 590 (discussing reason trial court did not err in allowing firearms

identification evidence). "The admissibility of expert testimony concerning scientific or forensic
evidence is governed in Maryland by the Frye-Reed standard, which provides that scientific
techniques can be admissible if they are 'generally accepted' in the scientific community." Id. at
586; see also Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ("[T]he thing from which
the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.").
79 912 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
" See id.at 855, 857 (introducing facts of case and firearms examiner's opinion that all were
fired from same firearm).
81 See id. at 856.
82

See supra notes 2-5, 10-11, and accompanying text (discussing facts and holding of

Green).
83 United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 106 (D. Mass. 2005) (describing defendants'
arguments); see also FED. R. EviD. 702.
84 Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 107-17 (summarizing problems with testimony of government's
expert and detailing expert's methodology of firearms identification); see also supra note 36 and
accompanying text (listing factors for determining admissibility under Daubert).
85 See Giannelli, supra note 62, at 52 (arguing courts became more critical of firearms
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decided in the same federal district court shortly after Green, the court held
that the firearms identification testimony was inadmissible under Rule 702
because the expert was lacking proper documentation of the examination of
the firearm and bullet casing.8 7 The court recognized that "the underlying
scientific principle behind firearm identification-that firearms transfer
88
unique toolmarks to spent cartridge cases-is valid under Daubert."
However, it found that due to the subjective nature of the identification, the
expert's qualifications, documentation of the analysis, peer review, and
other factors must be highly scrutinized.89
Like the court in Green, which allowed the expert in that case to
testify as to comparisons of the casings and the firearm, but not to the
"exclusion of every other firearm in the world," other courts are allowing
testimony regarding firearms identification, but limiting the scope. 90 In
United States v. Diaz,9' the court limited the scope of the expert's
testimony by allowing the expert to testify not to "the exclusion of all other
firearms in the world," but to a limited standard of a "reasonable degree of
certainty in the ballistics field., 92 Another example of expert testimony
being limited in scope was in the case of United States v. Glynn. 93 The
court in Glynn permitted the government's expert to testify that a firearms
match was merely "more likely than not," rather than hold that expert to a
higher level of certainty. 94 The Glynn court acknowledged the limitations
of this standard: "Because the burden of proof in a criminal case is
'beyond a reasonable doubt,' it follows that a conviction in a criminal case
identification techniques).
86 407 F. Supp. 2d 351 (D. Mass. 2006).
17 See id. at 374 ("Until the basis for the identification is described in such a
way that the
procedure performed by [the examiner] is reproducible and verifiable, it is inadmissible under
Rule 702.").
"" Id. at 355.

89See id ("Because of the subjective nature of the matching analysis, a firearms examiner
must be qualified through training, experience, and/or proficiency testing to provide expert
testimony[,] ...must follow the established standards for intellectual rigor ... with respect to
documentation of the reasons for concluding there is a match (including, where appropriate,

diagrams, photographs or written descriptions), and peer review of the results by another trained
examiner in the laboratory. These standards ensure the reliability of the expert's results and the
testability of the opinion.").
90 See United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108-09 (D. Mass. 2005); see also supra
notes 2-5, 14-16 and accompanying text (detailing facts and holding of Green).
91 No. CR 05-00167 WHA., 2007 WL 485967 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007).
92 Id. at *14.
9' See 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
94 Id.

at 574-75 (noting this satisfied Federal Rules of Evidence "without overstating the

capacity of the methodology to ascertain matches"). The court noted that inthe original trial, the
expert was persuaded to add the qualifier "at least" more likely than not; however, the court found
that "[t]o add the qualifier 'at least' is to inject an element of vagueness." Id.
at 575.

2012]

BALLISTICS EVIDENCE

may not rest exclusively on ballistics testimony." 95
A recent Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang,6
proffered new guidelines for the admissibility of firearms identification in
Massachusetts courts. 9 7 Following some of the reasoning set forth in
Monterio, the Pytou Heang court permitted the expert to testify to a
"reasonable degree of ballistic certainty," similar to how a doctor could
testify to cause of death or injuries to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty. 98 The court noted that phrases such as "absolute certainty"
should be avoided, and that the phrase "reasonable degree of scientific
certainty" should also be avoided because "it suggests that forensic
ballistics is a science, where it is clearly as much an art as a science." 99
The Pytou Heang court also established other guidelines for admissibility,
including "before trial, the examiner must adequately document the
findings or observations that support the examiner's ultimate opinion," and
"before an opinion is offered at trial, a forensics ballistics expert should
explain to the jury the theories and methodologies underlying the field of
forensic ballistics. "OO
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Needfor a CriticalApproach
Because the majority of states follow Daubert,the factors assessed
when determining whether to admit firearms identification evidence should
be the same in federal and many state courts throughout the country.1i1
While some state courts do not follow Daubert, their inquiry should

9' Id. at 575 n.14.
96

942 N.E.2d 927 (Mass. 2011).

9' See id. at 944-45.
98 Pytou Heang, 942 N.E.2d at 945; see also United States v.Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351,

355 (D. Mass. 2006); supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning in
Monteiro).

99 See Pytou Heang, 942 N.E.2d at 946. "[T]his documentary evidence, whether in the form
of measurements, notes, sketches, or photographs, shall be provided in discovery, so that defense
counsel will have an adequate and informed basis to cross-examine the forensic ballistics expert
at trial." Id.at 944.
100

See id.at 944-45 ("This testimony should include ...

explanation of how toolmarks are

imparted onto projectiles and cartridge casings; the differences between class, subclass, and
individual characteristics of firearms; and the different types of resulting toolmarks that
examiners look for and compare... which can narrow down the group of weapons that may have
fired a particular projectile, and .. which potentially may permit an opinion that a particular

firearm fired a projectile.").
101 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing number of states following federal
standard in Daubert).
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presumably be even more rigorous, as Daubertrelaxed the Frye standard in
favor of admissibility. 10 2 Despite these standards, and despite significant
criticism of the techniques of firearms identification, courts across the
country remain divided as to the reliability of firearms identification. 1 3
Two opposing views have emerged, with one side arguing that firearms
identification is "bogus," and the other retaining the view that this type of
forensic "science" is still acceptable in the scientific community. 104
Unquestionably, the field cannot have the reputable status it once held. 105
For example, the NRC reports in 2008 and 2009, critiquing various areas of
forensic science, seriously attacked the validity of firearms identification
evidence. 10 6
However, many courts may be "grandfathering in
irrationality" by allowing in firearms identification and other forms of
forensic evidence without a critical approach. 107
Courts that maintain their faith in firearms identification-and
other types of forensic science-cite the long history of its use in trials, and

reliability has been taken for granted in many cases. 1°

In one case

102 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing how Daubert relaxed
admissibility standard of Frye).
103 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 41 ("Adequate statistical empirical foundations and

proficiency testing do not exist for firearms and toolmark identification."); see also discussion
supra Part II (discussing various courts allowing or disallowing firearms identification evidence).
104 See Ungvarsky, supra note 13, at 610 (labeling FBI's discontinued bullet lead analysis
"bogus science").
Ballistics is the "forensic science" of eye-balling evidence related to firearms. Anyone
could do [it]. Here is how ... : You look at this picture, look at that picture, and then
look at them together. Do they look the same or are they different? If you think they
are the same, you say they are the same: a "match." This type of analysis does not
take expertise ....
Id. at 616. But see supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing courts admitting this type of
evidence because of its historical acceptance).
105 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text (discussing findings of NRC reports).
106 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
107 See United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 123 (D. Mass. 2005) (criticizing
admissibility as taken for granted without a critical approach); see also supra text accompanying
note 16.
108 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 33 ("Despite Daubert... courts have tended to wave away
challenges to the reliability and admissibility of this type of testimony by pointing to its
longstanding admission in court."); Giannelli & Friedman, supra note 58, at 1128 (noting
challenges to admissibility of firearm identification evidence failed recently after Daubert);see
also United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 526 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he matching of spent shell
casings to the weapon that fired them has been a recognized method of ballistics testing ... for
decades."); United States v. Foster, 300 F. Supp. 2d 375, 376 n.1 (D. Md. 2004) ("Ballistics
evidence has been accepted in criminal cases for many years . .. numerous cases have confirmed
the reliability of ballistics identification."); United States v. Martinez-Cintr6n, 136 F. Supp. 2d
17, 19 (D.P.R. 2001) ("[F]ingerprint evidence has been used forthe last hundred years forjudicial
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involving a different type of forensic evidence, fingerprint analysis, one
judge went so far as to admit the evidence because such analysis had

significant precedence, stating, "I took for granted that the reliability of [an
expert's] methods is properly taken for granted (like saying the sky is blue

or the sun rose in the east yesterday... )."109
The Court in Daubert considered the judge as having the
"gatekeeper" function of discerning whether scientific evidence is relevant
and reliable." 0 Under Daubert, admissibility of forensic evidence is to be

determined on a case-by-case basis."' However, Justice Rehnquist noted
in his dissent that the majority ruling in Daubertleft uncertainties as to how
it would be applied, stating, "I do not think [the gatekeeping function]
imposes on them either the obligation or the authority to become amateur
scientists in order to perform that role."" 2 'While judges should not have to
become amateur scientists, too many are taking traditionally accepted
methodologies for granted." 3 Historical precedence should not be enough
to warrant admissibility when significant scientific research and reports
have invalidated the reliability of long-standing forensic science
techniques.i1 4 Courts may be reluctant to disallow evidence once readily

purposes, and the precedence for its use more than satisfies the four-prong Daubert standard
); Flemingv. State,
.....1 A.3d 572, 590 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) ("[C]ourts have consistently
found the traditional method to be generally accepted within the scientific community, and to be
reliable.").
109 See Martinez-Crntr6n, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 18 n.I (explaining need for more reasoning for
admissibility on appeal).
110Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phanm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993) (describing role of
judge in determining admissibility).
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must determine
at the outset ... whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge
that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This
entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying
the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology
properly can be applied to the facts in issue.
Id. (footnote omitted).
111 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93; see also supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text

(describing the development of the standards of admissibility).
112 See Daubert,509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[C]ountless more questions
will surely arise when hundreds of district judges try to apply its teaching to particular offers of
expert testimony .... ). "I do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping
responsibility in deciding questions of the admissibility of proffered expert testimony. But I do
not think it imposes on them either the obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists in
order to perform that role." Id. at 600-01.
113 See supra notes 108-09109 and accompanying text (discussing courts routinely admit
evidence because of precedence of admissibility).
114 See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text (discussing NRC Reports and invalidation
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admissible; however, the longer it takes to adopt a more systematic
approach to admissibility of types of forensic evidence, including firearms
identification evidence, the longer the justice system will suffer." 5
B. PotentialGuidelines
Many courts have recognized the skepticism of the science behind
firearms identification and have excluded at least some of the testimony
related to this form of evidence. 1 16 Courts have acknowledged that an

expert's testimony can assist the trier of fact, but have differed as to what
extent an expert's testimony is reliable. 117 Many-but certainly not allcourts have disallowed testimony as to an exact match "to the exclusion of
every other firearm in the world."".8
Similarly, many courts have
prohibited an expert from using phrases like "absolute certainty" and
"scientific certainty," which create an illusion of such certainty where none
actually exists. 119
The courts in Monteiro and Pytou Heang proffered more specific
guidelines for firearms evidence and new standards of reliability when
expert testimony is presented. 120 In those cases, an expert could testify "to

a reasonable degree of ballistic certainty.'

121

Other courts have utilized the

of FBI bullet lead analysis).
115 See Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the Reliability and Admissibility of
Firearmsand Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 2, 80-91 (2005); see also
Larry A. Hammond, The Failure of Forensic Science Reform in Arizona, 93 JUDICATURE 227,
228, 230 (2010) ("By routinely allowing into evidence expert testimony that we know today
should have been excluded, and by closing courthouse doors to claims for redress after
conviction, the courts have contributed to the problems we face today ....[O]ne would hope that
with the announcement of every exoneration the judges across whose desks these cases passed
would pause to ask, 'what can we do to make sure that this doesn't happen again?"').
116 See United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108-09 (D. Mass. 2005);
see also Part
III.C.
117 See cases cited supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text (discussing various scopes of
testimony allowed by courts).
118 See Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 108-09; but see United States v. Natson, 469 F. Supp. 2d
1253, 1261-62 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (admitting testimony of expert to a degree of 100% certainty).
119 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (discussing holding and reasoning in
Pytou Heang).
120 See United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 355 (D. Mass. 2006) ("[T]he expert
may give an opinion of a match to a reasonable degree of certainty in the ballistics field.
However, the expert may not testify that there is a match to an exact statistical certainty.");
Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 942 N.E.2d 927, 945 (Mass. 2011) ("Where a qualified expert
has identified sufficient individual characteristic toolmarks reasonably to offer an opinion that a
particular firearm fired a projectile or cartridge casing recovered as evidence, the expert may offer
that opinion to a 'reasonable degree of ballistic certainty."'); see also supra notes 88-89 and
accompanying text (detailing standards set forth in Monteiro).
121 See cases cited supra note 120.
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standard of "more likely than not" or "a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty," or have allowed an expert to testify as to comparisons made
between a firearm and cartridges, but not to an122ultimate conclusion of
whether they were discharged from a specific gun.
The court in Pytou Heang offered not only the "reasonable degree
of ballistic certainty" standard, but also further guidelines for admissibility
of firearms identification evidence. 123 One of the guidelines provided in
Pytou Heang would be particularly helpful to jurors to ensure that they
have the necessary background information about firearms identification:
"[B]efore an opinion is offered at trial, a forensic ballistics expert should
explain to the jury the theories and methodologies underlying the field of
forensic ballistics."' 124 Ultimately, it is the jurors that will use the admitted
forensic evidence to make a determination of fact. 125 While the judge may
be the gatekeeper of reliability and relevance, the jurors will weigh the
evidence admitted, assuming that126it is reliable, and they should properly be
informed as to its shortcomings.
Not allowing testimony indicating an "absolute certainty" or
"scientific certainty" is a step in the right direction, however, phrases such
as "a reasonable degree of ballistic certainty" could be confusing to
jurors. 12 7 For instance, the phrase "ballistic certainty" -especially when
"ballistics" is not an accurate term as it encompasses all projectiles-may
' 12
not sound that different to a juror from the phrase "scientific certainty. , 8

122

See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text (explaining various standards used in

courts that have limited scope of expert's testimony).
123 See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing guidelines proposed by the Pytou
Heang court).
124 See Pytou Heang, 942 N.E.2d at 944.
125 See sources cited infra note 126.
126 See Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 115, at 12 ("[J]urors assume that judges review
scientific evidence before it is presented to them, and that any evidence used in a trial must be
above some threshold of quality. Because of these assumptions, jurors seem to be less critical of
scientific evidence used in trials and are more persuaded by it."); see also DiFonzo & Stern_
supra note 8, at 505-06 (noting jurors may have preconceived notions of validity of scientific
evidence); Ungvarsky, supra note 13, at 616 (noting "match" type testimony based on ballistics
analysis has powerful effect on jury).
127 See supra notes 91-99 (discussing various standards of certainty); see also Christina
Pazzanese, New Limits Put on Ballistics Testimony, MASS. LAWYERS WEEKLY, Feb. 28, 2011, at
27 (quoting one Boston attorney claiming "reasonable degree of ballistic certainty" standard is
essentially "made up"); Adina Schwartz, Challenging Firearmsand Toolmark Identification
PartTwo, CHAMPION, Nov./Dec. 2008, at 44 ("[R]estricting firearms and toolmark examiners to
testifying that their identifications are based on a 'reasonable degree of certainty in the ballistics
field' . . . is highly unlikely to make the jury aware that there are serious scientific problems with
the discipline.").
128 See supra note 23 and accompanying text (explaining why "ballistics" is an inaccurate
term).
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Both phrases imply "certainty" in this field of forensic science, which as
the NRC reports demonstrated, is not accurate. 129 Indeed, the court in
Glynn recognized the imperfection of the phrase "reasonable degree of
ballistic certainty" and disallowed this testimony in favor of testimony that
a match existed "more likely than not."' 30 The Glynn court noted that
"ballistics lacked the rigor of science . . . its methodology was too
subjective to permit opinions to be stated to 'a reasonable degree of
ballistic certainty."""' The courts in Pytou Heang, Glynn, and other
jurisdictions have taken steps in an attempt to offer greater consistency or
establish a more accurate standard of reliability; it remains to be seen,
however, whether other courts will follow suit or continue to rely on the
traditional approaches and acceptance of firearms identification expert
132
testimony.
V. CONCLUSION
Researchers in forensic science have found firearms identification
techniques, once widely accepted, to have serious flaws because the
methodology is an unreliable, subjective analysis. Courts often do not
critically apply the Daubert factors but merely accept toolmark or ballistics
identification as scientifically reliable. Because of the recent criticism of
firearms identification, some courts have limited expert testimony
concerning the examination of firearms, bullets, and shell casings, for
example. However, there has been a great disparity as to what evidence
courts are admitting, an obvious issue not only at the state level, but in
federal courts as well.
In many cases, courts have prohibited experts from testifying that
an exact "match" has been found between a bullet and a firearm. Other
courts have allowed experts to testify as to comparisons they have made, or
to varying degrees of certainty such as "more likely than not," or "to a
reasonable degree of ballistic certainty." The problems with reliability of
firearms identification evidence have not been recognized in every court,
however, and some courts are still allowing experts to testify to a "match"
to a degree of "100% certainty."

129
130

See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text (discussing findings of both NRC reports).
See United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (analyzing

methodology behind firearms identification and holding testimony to lower standard of certainty);

see also supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (discussing expert's "more likely than not"
testimony allowed in evidence).
131
132

Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 571.
See supra notes 116-31131 and accompanying text.
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Although the Daubert factors are to be determined on a case-bycase basis, there is too much disparity between the approaches to
admissibility of this type of evidence. Due to the recent scholarly criticism
of firearms identification, courts need to be much more critical of its
acceptance, and more limiting of testimony regarding this type of forensic
science. Because the underlying methodology is the same everywhere,
there should be a specific, accurate, and clear standard concerning the
extent to which firearms identification evidence should be relied upon and
admitted in courts.
Bonnie Lanigan

